Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Peter Dale Scott

59. Mills, The Underground Empire, 787. One of Khun Sa’s many Western interviewers, Edith Mirante, wrote later that “Khun Sa was widely known to spend time in Chiang Mai and even occasionally visit his wife in Bangkok, but he was coyly going along with the Thai fiction that he was a wanted man with a price on his head” (Edith T. Mirante, Burmese Looking Glass: A Human Rights Adventure and a Jungle Revolution [New York: Grove Press, 1993], 170).

60. Francis Belanger, Drugs, the U.S., and Khun Sa (Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1989, 102–4); cf. Mills, Underground Empire, 1071–72; Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 321–23; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 418–21. Before the attack, Khun Sa “initiated terrorist missions against American officials in northern Thailand. Following Khun Sa’s directives, two CIA agents were killed, a move that proved to be a big mistake. Families of U.S. officials were evacuated from the northern provinces to Bangkok for their protection, and the war against Khun Sa was stepped up dramatically. . . . In a few weeks [after the attack], things were back to normal for Khun Sa. When interrupted to ask why he had ordered the killings of Westerners, he replied, “Because they turned on me,” he shouted. “At one time, they were my partners—them, the DEA and the CIA, both” (Belanger, Drugs, the U.S., and Khun Sa, 102–4).

61. James Gritz, A Nation Betrayed (Boulder City, NV: Lazarus, 1989), 86, quoted in Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 379. (Route 1285 can be seen on Google Maps.) Gritz’s detailed account is erratic and unreliable, but Lintner, who was present at the time on the Thai side of the border, assures me that his overall picture is accurate. Cf. Belanger, Drugs, the U.S., and Khun Sa, 108–9: “The road, capable of accommodating 10-ton trucks, was ironically built by the Thai Government with manpower, time, and materials financed by U.S. taxpayers’ money allocated to drug suppression funds.”

62. Khun Sa fared far better in Burma after 1982, when he ceased to be subordinate to the KMT generals and began to dominate the market himself.

63. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 392.

64. Alfred W. McCoy, “Lord of Druglords: One Life as Lesson for US Drug Policy,” Crime, Law, and Social Change, November 1998, 309.

65. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 392.

66. Mirante, Burmese Looking Glass, 147: “I suspected that Ne Win wouldn’t mind if it killed more than poppies in the hills of the Shan State.” A professor told Mirante that an environmental impact assessment was done before the program started. “It made clear that spraying in Burma would be environmentally risky and of dubious effectiveness. State buried the report and went ahead with the program anyway. . . . The U.S. ambassador to Burma, O’Donohue, told our conference that the spraying program was the greatest success in recent U.S.-Burma relations” (148). Cf. Mother Jones Magazine, February–March 1989, 41.

67. Shelby Tucker, Among Insurgents: Walking through Burma (London: Radcliffe, 2000), 93. For similar reports on the DEA’s use of 2,4-D against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia, see David Weir and Mark Schapiro, Circle of Poison: Pesticides and People in a Hungry World (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1981).

68. McCoy, “Lord of Druglords,” 454–55; Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 278, 380–81, 377–78.

69. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 70; cf. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 234.

70. Mills, Underground Empire, 201–3, 222 (quoting from internal DEA report on termination of Operation Durian); McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 431. Poonsiri’s main Bangkok purchaser, Lu Hsu-Shui, had established himself by trading opium for gold with the KMT in northern Thailand (Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 307). In San Francisco, Lu Hsu-shui and two of his sons paid one and a half million dollars for the Shaw Hotel, today the Renoir Hotel (Mills, Underground Empire, 214).

71. Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, New York Times, June 16, 1986.

72. Mills, Underground Empire, 1076–78.

73. Keith Quincy, Hmong: History of a People‎ (Cheney: Eastern Washington University Press, 1995), 163.

74. Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 73–75, citing Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah: Pakistan’s Struggle for Democracy (London: H. Hamilton, 1991), 222; cf. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 479. Fazle Haq was the governor of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province; at the same time he was also an important CIA contact and supporter of the Afghan mujahideen, some of whom—it was no secret—were supporting themselves by major opium and heroin trafficking through the province. However, after lengthy correspondence with Fazle Haq’s son, I am persuaded that there are no known grounds to accuse Fazle Haq of having profited personally from the drug traffic. See “Clarification from Peter Dale Scott re Fazle Haq,” 911Truth.org, http://www.911truth.org/article

.php?story=20090223165146219.

75. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 73–75, citing McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 475 (leading drug lords), 464 (60 percent).

76. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 461; citing interview with Dr. David Musto.

77. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 462.

78. Thomas Fuller, “No Blowing Smoke: Poppies Fade in Southeast Asia,” New York Times, September 16, 2007. Cf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Opium Poppy Cultivation in Southeast Asia: Lao PDR, Myanmar and Thailand,” 2009, 3: “Opium poppy cultivation in Lao PDR, Myanmar and Thailand combined has decreased from an estimated 157,900 hectares in 1998, the year of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs, to only 29,400 hectares in 2007. Despite a 22% increase in 2007, this corresponds to an 81% overall reduction in only nine years.”

79. “Figure 2: Global Opium Poppy Cultivation (Hectares), 1990–2007,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Opium Poppy Cultivation in Southeast Asia: Lao